

Econ 301: Microeconomic Analysis

Prof. Jeffrey Naecker

Wesleyan University

Expected Utility

Motivating Example: Insurance

- ▶ Income is \$35,000
- ▶ With probability $p = .01$, lose \$10,000 to a house fire
- ▶ Can buy \$10,000 of insurance coverage for \$100
 - ▶ Then net income will be \$34,900 regardless of whether house fire happens or not
- ▶ Which option would you rather have?
 1. 99% chance of \$35,000 with 1% chance of \$25,000
 2. \$34,900 for sure
- ▶ Consumer will pick option with higher *expected utility*

Contingent Consumption

- ▶ Different *states of the world* with corresponding probabilities
- ▶ *Contingent consumption plan*: what consumption will be in each state of the world
- ▶ For insurance example:
 - ▶ Two states of the world: good (no fire) and bad (fire)
 - ▶ Bad state occurs with probability π
 - ▶ Income M received in either state
 - ▶ Loss L if bad state
 - ▶ Choice amount of insurance coverage K
 - ▶ Insurance premium γ : cost of getting \$1 of coverage
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$$\begin{array}{l} M - \gamma K \\ M - \gamma K - L + K \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} = C_g \\ = C_b \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{with probability } 1 - \pi \\ \text{with probability } \pi \end{array}$$

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 - ▶ Goes through net endowment $(M - L, M)$ (ie when $K = 0$)

Budget Constraint Graphically




Figure 12.1

Expected Utility

- ▶ Consider a general contingent consumption plan

$$A = (\pi_i, c_i)_{i=1}^N = (\pi_1, c_1; \pi_2, c_2; \dots; \pi_N, c_N)$$

meaning

- ▶ consume c_1 in state 1, which occurs with probability π_1
- ▶ consume c_2 in state 2, which occurs with probability π_2
- ▶ and so on
- ▶ A is also called a *gamble*
- ▶ The *expected utility* of A is

$$EU(A) = \sum_i \pi_i u(c_i) = \pi_1 u(c_1) + \pi_2 u(c_2) + \dots + \pi_N u(c_N)$$

- ▶ Compare to the *expected value* of A :

$$EV(A) = \sum_i \pi_i c_i = \pi_1 c_1 + \pi_2 c_2 + \dots + \pi_N c_N$$

What Shape Should $u(x)$ Have?

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 - ▶ $EV = \frac{1}{2}2 + \frac{1}{4}4 + \frac{1}{8}8 + \dots = 1 + 1 + 1 + \dots = \infty$
- ▶ It is clear that there must be *diminishing marginal utility of money*
 - ▶ Intuition: an extra \$1000 is massive windfall for a very poor person but not even noticeable for very rich person
- ▶ We can rationalize the typically observed behavior by assuming that $u(x)$ is concave

Risk Aversion

- ▶ If $u(x)$ is concave, we say the underlying preferences are *risk averse*
 - ▶ Recall concavity of u means $u'' < 0$
- ▶ If risk averse, then $EU(A) < u(EV(A))$ because of concavity of $u(\cdot)$
 - ▶ In words: expected utility of a gamble is less than the utility of its expected value
- ▶ Useful tip for drawing EU: If gamble A pays off either x_1 or x_2 , then $EU(A)$ lies on the line connecting $u(x_1)$ and $u(x_2)$, directly above $EV(A)$

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


Figure
12.2

Certainty Equivalent and Risk Premium

- ▶ The *certainty equivalent* of a gamble A is the amount CE such that $u(CE) = EU(A)$
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 - ▶ Positive for risk averse preferences

Risk Aversion vs Risk Seeking

- ▶ Can also have *risk-seeking* preferences (convex $u(x)$) where all of the above statements are reversed
- ▶ Can also have *risk-neutral* preferences (linear $u(x)$)

In summary:

Risk Averse	Risk Neutral	Risk Seeking
$u(x)$ concave	$u(x)$ linear	$u(x)$ convex
$EU(A) < u(EV(A))$	$EU(A) = u(EV(A))$	$EU(A) > u(EV(A))$
$CE < EV(A)$	$CE = EV(A)$	$CE > EV(A)$
$RP > 0$	$RP = 0$	$RP < 0$

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- ▶ Risk premium of gamble: $RP = \$10 - \$9.36 = \$0.64$

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- ▶ But this depends on on the scale of utility
- ▶ Instead, use the coefficient of *absolute risk aversion*, $-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$
 - ▶ Also know as *Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion*
- ▶ For risk-averse individual, coefficient must be positive
- ▶ Person with higher coefficient is more risk averse

Interpreting Absolute Risk Aversion

- ▶ Coefficient may be constant, increasing, or decreasing as x increases
- ▶ Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA): as wealth increases, hold same number of dollars in risky asset
- ▶ Increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA): as wealth increases, hold fewer dollars in risky asset
- ▶ Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA): as wealth increases, hold more dollars in risky asset

Relative Risk Aversion

- ▶ May want to scale by wealth/income x
- ▶ Use *coefficient of relative risk aversion*, $-x \frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$
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- ▶ Coefficient may be constant (CRRA), increasing (IRRA), or decreasing (DRRA) as x increases
 - ▶ Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA): as wealth increases, hold same percentage of dollars in safe asset
 - ▶ Increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA): as wealth increases, hold higher percentage of dollars in safe asset
 - ▶ Decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA): as wealth increases, hold lower percentage of dollars in safe asset

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- ▶ Which one is more risk averse? $u(x) = \ln(x)$ is more risk averse

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- ▶ What should γ equal in a competitive insurance market?
 - ▶ Assume company makes no profit, because of competitive pressure from other firms
 - ▶ Then $P = 0$, which implies $\gamma = \pi$
 - ▶ This is called the *fair insurance price*: eg if there is a 1% chance of disaster, \$1 of coverage costs \$0.01

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 - ▶ From FOC of EU we can get

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- ▶ Recall that under fair insurance, $\gamma = \pi$
- ▶ Then $\frac{u'(C_g)}{u'(C_b)} = 1$, which implies $C_g = C_b$ or equivalently $K = L$
- ▶ That is, consumer chooses *full insurance* regardless of degree of risk aversion

Appendix

Why Is Expected Utility Reasonable?

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 4. Independence: For any gambles A , B , C such that $A \succeq B$ and any $p \in (0, 1]$, we must have $pA + (1 - p)C \succeq pB + (1 - p)C$.

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Theorem (von Neuman and Moregensten)

Preferences over gambles that satisfy conditions 1-4 can be represented by expected utility.

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 - ▶ Recall $EU(A) = \sum_i \pi_i u(x_i) = \pi_1 u(x_1) + \pi_2 u(x_2) + \pi_3 u(x_3)$
 - ▶ Note that utility is *additively separable* in probabilities
 - ▶ That is, $EU(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \cdot) = f_1(\pi_1) + f_2(\pi_2) + f_3(\pi_3)$

The Importance of Independence

- ▶ The independence axiom is the most important one for expected utility theory
- ▶ What is the intuition for this axiom?
 - ▶ How you feel about a prize (ie a specific amount of money) does not depend on the probability you receive it
- ▶ How does this manifest in EUT?
 - ▶ Let gamble A have three possible outcomes, i.e.
 $A = (\pi_1, x_1; \pi_2, x_2; \pi_3, x_3)$
 - ▶ Recall $EU(A) = \sum_i \pi_i u(x_i) = \pi_1 u(x_1) + \pi_2 u(x_2) + \pi_3 u(x_3)$
 - ▶ Note that utility is *additively separable* in probabilities
 - ▶ That is, $EU(\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \cdot) = f_1(\pi_1) + f_2(\pi_2) + f_3(\pi_3)$
 - ▶ Note that utility is *linear* in probabilities
 - ▶ That is, $EU(\pi_i, \cdot) = a\pi_i + b$ for some constants a and b